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This co-authored volume on Charles Darwin’s life and work is the culmination and, in its own
way, a celebration of a long-standing dispute between Robert J. Richards and Michael Ruse,
two prominent historians and philosophers of biology. In its specific and highly original
structure, this book offers an intriguing example of unresolved dialectics: It first provides a
thesis by one and an antithesis by the other author. Instead of trying to resolve the tension
between their accounts, the authors subsequently enter into an exchange of critical commen-
tary. This exchange is capped by a remarkably inconclusive but much more harmonious
epilogue that moves from historical and biographical to contemporary perspectives on the
lasting importance of Darwin’s thought. The authors then leave it to the reader to create (or fail
to create) a synthesis from their contrasting viewpoints.
This design for a book might look frustrating but is in fact very instructive for everyone
interested in how far interpretations of a great scientist’s theories and their biographical and
historical embedding might lie apart, and why they might do so. Few historical figures are as
inviting of this kind of exercise as Darwin. To be sure, Richards and Ruse do not try to make
their images of Darwin mutually unrecognisable, nor do they differ in their appreciation of
Darwin’s accomplishments, but neither do they seek a lot of common ground. Instead, they
undertake the experiment of letting their views openly and unresovedly clash in front of their
readers, while making it fully clear that the images they paint of Darwin are normatively
invested but still scholarly sound and fact-based appropriations of the historical figure.
One intriguing effect of this format is that the tension between the two images of Charles
Darwin’s life and work becomes palpable for every reasonably well-informed reader with an
immediacy that would not be available in a mere comparison between some of their works.
This is so for the first, more obvious, reason that the authors explicitly relate their views to
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mutually well-informed, friendly and well-mannered way that is reminiscent of the scholarly
letter-writing still common in Darwin’s time. The second, less obvious reason for the instruc-
tiveness of the unresolved tension lies in the opportunity for the reader to observe, side by side,
how exactly the two authors build their respective narratives in terms of argument and rhetoric.
In Ludwik Fleck’s terms, Richards’ and Ruse’s Denkstil (“thought styles” in his 1935/1979
Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact) differ in the most remarkable and sometimes
surprising ways. There is much to be learned in this respect from what they state but also from
what they do not state.
Taken at face value, Ruse’s and Richards’ narratives can be summarised in the following
well-rehearsed way: On Ruse’s account, Darwin the person and Darwin’s theory were a
product of his time, country and social class. Far from being a coherent determining force,
both the conservative, Anglican element and its views of Natural Theology and divine
providence, and the liberal, industrial element and its views of mechanism and progress were
present in Darwin’s intellectual upbringing. In their unique combination, these factors suffice
to explain how Darwin came to conceive of his theory of evolution through variation and
natural selection. On Richards’ account, Darwin the person and Darwin’s theory were a
product of their time and place too, but were transformed into their ultimate shape by the
influence of German Romantic science, in particular Alexander von Humboldt and Johann
Wolfgang Goethe and their holistic, deistic views of nature. Neither Richards nor Ruse deny
the existence of the influences from either side but, on a proximate level, they differ in the
assessment of their relative importance. On an ultimate level, however, more is at stake.
A good starting point for a diagnosis is the space and importance that is given to Darwin’s
journey as a naturalist on the HMS Beagle by each author. While Ruse duly but briefly
acknowledges this journey as one episode in Darwin’s intellectual biography (and the only
time he ever spent abroad) and much more extensively dwells on Darwin’s social class and the
context of British politics, culture and religious and educational institutions in the early
nineteenth century, Richards describes Darwin’s journey to the tropics as the ultimate expe-
rience to shape his theory of evolution, allowing himself to pay less attention to how British
culture and society may have looked and felt at that time. Richards also elaborates on the
literature that influenced and inspired Darwin, above all von Humboldt’s approach to nature
and its investigation in his 1814/1818 Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial
Regions of the New Continent, but also, although mostly mediated through the writings of
Darwin’s British contemporaries, Goethe’s morphological theory and Kant’s moral philosophy.
Put differently, where Ruse talks a lot about Darwin’s formative years and the social factors
and the education that did that forming, Richards highlights the transformative experience of
the Beagle journey and Darwin’s education through reading.
The diagnosis is that these are not merely differences in emphasis but in general outlook:
Ruse has an almost social determinist (rather than merely social constructivist) view of the
making of Darwin’s thinking that testifies to his Marxist influences, whereas Richards adopts a
much more classically humanist stance that cherishes individual creativity and intellectual
freedom. Hence, the first major difference in Denkstil between Ruse and Richards is how they
position themselves with respect to Marx’ famous dictum: “It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”
(Karl Marx, 1859/1977, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). If you are a
child of the British upper middle class in the early nineteenth century, with a certain family
background and a given set of intellectual influences, your way of thinking is bound not to
stray very far from that background. The originality of Darwin’s contribution owes to the
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unique constellation of influences that comprises Paley’s Natural Theology, Smith’s and
Malthus’ political economy and Lyell’s geology in particular. Among these influences,
German Romanticism is of lesser importance precisely because it was extraneous (if not to
say foreign) to the conditions of social existence under which Darwin grew up, but more of an
acquired taste. This is Ruse’s underlying narrative on the relation between existence and
consciousness. In contrast, Richards’ underlying narrative is this: If you are a child of that time
and that country and that class, there is no reason why you should not be able to transcend the
intellectual—and in some respects geographic—boundaries thus imposed, given a bright mind,
a good deal of effort and some favourable circumstances. If anything, a transformative
experience of the Beagle kind will be a potent catalyst to this process.
The second, related major difference in Denkstil between Ruse and Richards is that Richards, a
historian by denomination, argues much more philosophically than Ruse, the card-carrying philos-
opher in this book. If one’s scholarly convictions are bounded by historical circumstance and social
class, it will be more important to describe these influences than to explore the structure of one’s
arguments qua arguments—whichwill ultimately spell bad news for philosophy though. In contrast,
if one tries to carve out the systematic import that one thinker’s reasoning has on another’s, and if
one takes that import seriously as being systematic, it will be more important to reconstruct the lines
of reasoning involved and their interconnections than to unfold the socio-economic background on
which they developed. By implicature rather than corollary, Ruse’s historically and socially coloured
image of Darwin’s world looks notably darker, colder and more “red in tooth and claw” than
Richards’ rationally minded and humanistic one.
From these contrasting characterisations of Darwin’s influences, there flow equally con-
trasting descriptions of Darwin’s concrete views of central subjects of his theory: Darwin
conceived of nature as essentially organic and teleological (Richards) or as reducible to
mechanical and law-like principles (Ruse); he believed that natural selection acts on groups,
too (Richards), or only on individuals (Ruse); he viewed evolution as being inherently
progressive (Richards) or as something whose progressive character needs explanation
(Ruse); he deemed human morality to be based on a genuine moral sense (Richards) or on
mere utilitarian concerns (Ruse); and when it comes to religion, he assumed God and nature to
be unified in “deistic” fashion, and a benevolent being above all (Richards), or he conceived of
Him as the more stern, un-involved creator-god handed down to us by the “theistic” main-
stream (Ruse). The beliefs on each subject ascribed to Darwin are mutually inconsistent when
compared individually, but when viewed as a set of dichotomies, each side forms a coherent
belief system. One system is deeply progressive, teleological and Romantic, the other thor-
oughly utilitarian, mechanistic and Anglican. No person could possibly commit to both belief
systems at the same time—or indeed ever, save a fundamental experience of conversion.
Richards’ and Ruse’s freely admitted charge of appropriating Darwin being granted, and their
work on fleshing out Darwin’s intellectual development being fully appreciated, there still might
be an issue with these images of Darwinian belief systems: they create an unduly static and
monolithic impression. First of all, a person’s views may be exposed to contradicting influences,
pulled into different directions over time or even synchronously, become unstable at one point and
restabilise at a quite different one, or even remain conflicted over an extended period of time. A
person generally neither benefits from a birds-eye view of the factors that influence his or her
intellectual trajectory nor from an ex-post view of where it ultimately leads. Being in command of
such perspectives is the privilege of the historian or biographer—a privilege that is richly
exploited by Ruse and Richards. Conversely, one could not possibly awake from any dogmatic
slumber if his or her intellectual trajectory had no chance of being exposed to and modified by
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contrasting influences. If anything, Darwin’s long and tormentous struggle with Christian faith
and the remaining imprint of the concept of God on his work even after his turn to agnosticism are
prime examples of a complex and conflicted intellectual development—of which both authors are
well-aware. An image of Darwin as either quintessentially Romantic or irreducibly Anglican
might inadvertently eclipse such important transformations. Ambiguities and tensions in one’s
views might even become productive in terms of shaping one’s intellectual accomplishments in
complementary ways. The relation between Darwin’s deeply aesthetic, romantically informed
view of nature and his more law-like conception of natural selection and other forces in evolution
might be a case in point here (with which neither Richards nor Ruse would agree though). It is
possible that a coherent and tenable theory develops from prima facie contradicting influences.
The dichotomy between Ruse’s and Richards’ accounts of Darwin’s development might inad-
vertently create an illusion of biographical coherence that obscures this possibility.
Still, there is a number of benefits in the contrasting images provided by Richards and Ruse,
which mostly work by example: First, with respect to Darwin as a historical figure, they raise
the question of whether and how far a thinker can raise above his influences—a question to
which the authors give quite distinct answers. Second, on the level of underlying narratives,
they illustrate the power and persuasiveness of such narratives and the values embedded in
them. Third, in view of overcoming the unresolved tensions between Richards’ and Ruse’s
accounts, they invite a wide range of possible solutions from their readers: one might simply
be persuaded by one narrative or another; one might prefer to critically reconstruct or
deconstruct either narrative or both; or one may try to forge a synthesis between them, as
the author of this review has tried before (Hajo Greif, 2015, The Darwinian Tension). Besides
the evident and eminent scholarship exhibited in this book, it is this open-endedness that is of
genuine educational value. It not only requires and enables the reader to connect the dots him-
or herself but also encourages open-mindedness over scholarly partisanship.
In content and form, this book will be very useful reading in upper-level history and
philosophy of science as well as in social studies of science classes. As an introduction to
Darwin and his theory, it is of limited suitability though, not because of its specific design but
because it will be more rewarding to readers with some previous knowledge of the subject.
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